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IMPLEMENTING THE UNIFORM CONFLICT OF LAWSLIMITATIONS ACT IN WASHINGTON
Christopher R.M. Stanton
Abstract: The traditional rule for conflicts statutes of limitation is that the forum applies
its own limitation period. In 1983, Washington adopted the Uniform Conflict of LawsLimitations Act (the "Uniform Act") and is now one of six states to have adopted the Uniform
Act. The Uniform Act represents the culmination of years of independent judicial and
legislative attempts to change the traditional rule so as to provide some rational basis for the
application of a particular statute of limitation in a given case. However, the Uniform Act
presents some interpretive difficulties with respect to the question of which state's law forms
the "substantive base" for a particular claim, and for this reason courts have struggled to apply
the Uniform Act in a consistent manner. This Comment discusses some of the interpretive
problems facing the courts and advocates an approach that differentiates between the law
which invokes the statute of limitation and the law which governs peripheral substantive
issues. Under an approach which focuses on the law that invokes a particular statute of
limitation, the Uniform Act will be applied in a manner which furthers its purpose and
maintains uniformity in treatment of conflicts between statutes of limitation.

Suppose a corporation operates solely within State A but distributes
products to customers throughout the United States. A customer in State
B wants to sue the corporation under a statute unique to State B which
imposes strict liability on manufacturers. It has been three years since the
injury, however, and both State A and State B's two-year statutes of
limitation have expired. The customer does some research and discovers
that State C has a six-year limitation period for tort actions. A court in
State C accepts the case under its own, longer, statute of limitation, then
applies the strict liability law of State B to hold the defendant corporation
liable for the injury.
This hypothetical illustrates two of the problems that can arise when a
forum applies its own statute of limitation regardless of its connection to
the case or the substantive law governing the claim. First, this approach
results in the anomalous situation where the plaintiff, aided by the courts,
creates a new body of law more favorable to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff
in the hypothetical is not in a position to file a successful suit under the
internal law of any one of the states involved. The claim is barred in
State B and does not exist in either State A or State C. Nevertheless, by
1. See, eg., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979) (allowing action by
Kansas plaintiff against Wisconsin defendant served in Mississippi on Kansas tort claim that was
barred under both Kansas and Wisconsin law); Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139 (Alaska 1962)
(applying Canada's law to find liability, but applying Alaska's longer limitation period to hold that
suit was not barred).
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combining State B's unique strict liability law and State C's unusually
long limitation period, the plaintiff creates a legal framework under
which the plaintiff prevails.
In addition to the problem of "law selection" described above, the
hypothetical also demonstrates an instance of forum shopping.2 The
plaintiff files in State C solely to take advantage of that state's unusually
long statute of limitation. State C may have no connection to the case
other than the minimal contacts required for asserting jurisdiction over
the defendant. In the above hypothetical, no injury occurred in State C,
the company is not based there, and indeed the plaintiff might have no
contact whatsoever with State C. Yet the suit is instituted and tried there.
Situations illustrated by the above hypothetical arose under the
traditional common law rule for choosing an applicable statute of
limitation. 3 Under the traditional Anglo-American approach, the general
rule of conflicts law was that a court applied its own procedural rules.4
Statutes of limitation were characterized as "procedural" rather than
"substantive." 5 Therefore, courts were free to apply their own statutes of
limitation to any claim over which the court had jurisdiction, regardless
of the forum's relationship to the claim and regardless of the substantive
law which governed the claim.
Both commentators and courts recognized the inequitable and
inefficient results of the traditional approach.6 Nevertheless, the
constitutionality of the common law rule was upheld by the Supreme
Court.7 Thus, it was left to the courts and legislatures to develop
techniques to avoid the problematic situations described above. The
exceptions they developed led the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws8 to propose the Uniform Conflict
2. This is a recurring problem, particularly in the well-known havens of Mississippi and New
Hampshire which have relatively long limitation periods. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465
U.S. 770 (1984) (holding that libel suit was properly permitted in New Hampshire despite fact that it
was only state whose limitation period had not run and plaintiff had never been to state).
3. See, e.g., Nelson v. Eckert, 329 S.W.2d 426 (Ark. 1959). For other examples, see supranotes 1,
2. See generally Margaret Rosso Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and t.he Conflict of Liavs:
Modern Analysis, 1980 Ariz. St. L. J. 1, 15-17 (1980).
4. Grossman, supra note 3, at 10-1I.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 415-16 (N.J. 1973); Lorenzen, The Statute
of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919).
7. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312
(1839).
8. The first manifestation of the National Conference of Commissioners occurred on August 24,
1892, when representatives of six states met to promote uniformity between the laws of the states.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
of Laws-Limitations Act.9 The Uniform Act sets forth a consistent and
rational method for selecting a statute of limitation in a conflict situation.
It provides for application of the statute of limitation of the state upon
whose law the claim is substantively based.'0
This Comment will examine interpretive difficulties in applying the
Uniform Act and the generally inadequate treatment of the Uniform Act
by Washington courts. First, part I discusses the evolution of the Uniform
Act. Next, part II sets forth the relevant text of the Uniform Act and
introduces its essential features. Part III describes how Washington
courts have handled conflicts between statutes of limitation under the
Uniform Act. Part IV evaluates two methods of interpreting and applying
the Uniform Act. Finally, part V illustrates how only an analysis that
focuses on the law that invokes the statute of limitation yields results that
are consistent with the goals of the Uniform Act.
I.

HISTORY

The evolution of conflicts law concerning statutes of limitation has
been treated in depth by several commentators." For the purposes of this
Comment a brief summary is sufficient.
Conflicts law has historically drawn a distinction between
"procedural" and "substantive" law.'2 For reasons of sovereignty and
efficiency a court was always free to apply its own procedural rules
regardless of the law which governed the substantive claim in the case. 3
The rationale underlying this rule was that it would impose too great a
burden on a court to force it to alter its procedural rules every time a
foreign law was invoked. 4 England became the exception among the
countries in Europe, however, when it characterized statutes of limitation
as procedural in Leroux v. Brown. 5 England found support for its
Today the National Conference of Commissioners includes Commissioners from each of the states,
as well as from the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Frederick Miller et al.,
Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: The Centennial of the National
Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, 46 Bus. Law. 1449, 1449-50 (1991).
9. Uniform Conflict ofLaws-Limitations Act, 12 U.L.A. 61-65 (Supp. 1994).
10. Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 2(a)(l), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63 (Supp. 1994).
11. See, e.g., Edgar H. Ailes, Limitation ofActions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 474
(1933); Grossman, supranote 3; Lorenzen, supranote 6.
12. Grossman, supra note 3, at 9-12.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 415 (N.J. 1973).
15. Leroux v. Brown, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (C.P. 1852).
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position in the writings of Dutch jurists who advocated a more expansive
use of the procedural characterization. 6
The distinction between procedural and substantive law has never
been clear. The distinction is sometimes described in terms of whether
the law in question affects a right or a remedy.' Substantive law impacts
the rights of the individual, whereas procedural law is merely one of
many possible methods for providing a remedy.' In 1839, the U.S.
Supreme Court employed the rights/remedy differentiation in M'Elmoyle
v. Cohen, when it upheld the common law rule characterizing statutes of
limitation as procedural.' With such distinguished support, this view
continued to represent the majority view among court, in the United
States.2 °
The common law rule was not, however, without critics.2 The
mechanical application of the forum's statute of limitation in all cases
was viewed as arbitrary and unfair. 22 To avoid these problems the courts
developed escape devices, and the legislatures enacted borrowing
statutes. These judicial and legislative exceptions have sharply curtailed
the application of the common law rule in most states.
1.

JudicialCreations-EscapeDevices

As mentioned above, characterization of statutes of limitation as
procedural was often justified by means of the right/remedy distinction.
However, this justification disappears when the statute of limitation
becomes so closely tied to the foreign cause of action hat the remedy
becomes part of the right.23 It is in this type of situation ihat courts have

16. Lorenzen, supra note 6, at 492.
17. Ibrahim J. Wahl, BorrowingStatutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modem Choice of Law, 57
UMKC L. Rev. 681, 685 (1989).
18. Id.
19. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet. 312) (1839).
20. Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 585, 504 (1934).
21. The most noteworthy of whom was Professor Lorenzen who wrote:
A right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most valuable
attribute. After the enforcement of the right of action is gone under the law governing the rights
of the parties, it would seem clear upon principle that the same consequences should attach to
the operative facts everywhere.
Lorenzen, supranote 6, at 496.
22. Id.
23. Grossman, supranote 3, at 12.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
created exceptions to the common law rule and applied the foreign
statute of limitation.
One such exception applies a statute of limitation specifically
provided for in the statute creating the cause of action. Referred to as the
"built in" test, this approach treats the limitation period as a limitation on
the right created by the statute because the limitation period is specified
in the statute.24 Courts have applied this exception in cases involving
wrongful death statutes." Similarly, the "specificity" test allows a court
to apply a statute of limitation which is specifically directed at a newly
created liability because the limitation period can be viewed as a
qualification of the liability.26 The difference between these two tests is
that under the specificity test the limitation period does not have to be
included in the statute creating the right.27 Yet a third test requires the
court to determine whether the statute of limitation is in the nature of a
substantive termination of the right rather than a procedural bar to the
28
claim.
2.

LegislativeEnactments-BorrowingStatutes

Legislatures, in addition to courts, have carved out exceptions to the
traditional rule that a forum applies its own statute of limitation. One
commentator identified seventeen different exceptions, collectively
referred to as borrowing statutes.29 A typical borrowing statute provides
that an action barred by the law of the place where the action "accrued"
is barred in the forum as well.3 °
Where a borrowing statute is in place, the choice of a forum will have
less impact on the statute of limitation to be applied. Nevertheless, the
24. Id. at 12-13.
25. See, e.g., The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886), overruled on othergrounds by Moragne

v. State Marine Lines 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Harrisburgwas the first case to make use of the
"built in" test. See also Moragne,398 U.S. 375. But see Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass.
1972) (holding that recovery for wrongful death was common law remedy and not one created by
statute so that limitation was general and not tied to statute).
26. Grossman, supra note 3, at 12-13.
27. Id. at 13; see also Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451,454 (1904).
28. See, e.g., Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d
Cir. 1930) (stating that if defense must be pleaded, it bars only remedy, but if it need not be pleaded
then it is condition on right).
29. Dean H. Vernon, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32
Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 287, 293-98 (1960); see also John W. Ester, BorrowingStatutes of Limitation
and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 33, 79-84 (1962).
30. Grossman, supra note 3, at 14.
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sheer number of different borrowing statutes and the theories they
represent demonstrates the lack of consensus on an appropriate rule of
law in this area.3' Differences in interpretation of key ideas such as the
term "accrued" contribute to the disarray.32 In addition, borrowing
statutes rarely address all possible issues that might arise.33
The first attempt at establishing a uniform rule for selection of statutes
of limitation was the Uniform Statute of Limitation on Foreign Claims
Act, finalized in 1957.34 Itprovided for the application of the shorter of
the statute of limitation in effect where the action accrued or the forum's
statute of limitation.35 Only three states ever adopted this harsh and
inflexible rule.36
In addition to the harshness of the rule, this first attempt at a uniform
law governing statutes of limitation shared another flaw common to most
borrowing statutes of the time. By their terms, the original borrowing
statutes relied heavily on the interpretation of the term "accrual," a
concept having its roots in the traditional "vested rights" approach to
conflicts of law.37 The definition of "accrual" varied, but generally it was
held to mean the location where the last event necessary to create a cause
of action occurred.38 The doctrine of vested rights, and along with it the
concept of accrual, was subject to a barrage of criticism from advocates
of a new conflicts methodology.39 These commentators put forth at least
four new theories for choice of law in conflicts situations," two of which

31. See Robert J. Nordstrom, Ohio's BorrowingStatute of Limitations-A QuakingQuagmire in a
Dismal Swamp, 16 Ohio St. L.J. 183 (1955).
32. Vernon, supra note 29, at 300-06.
33. Grossman, supranote 3, at 15; see also Robert A. Leflar, Choice-of-Law Statutes, 44 Tenn. L.
Rev. 951, 961 (1977).
34. Unif.Statute ofLimitation on Foreign ClaimsAct, 14 U.L.A. 507 (1980).
35. Unif Statute ofLimitation on Foreign ClaimsAct § 2, 14 U.L.A. 507,508 (1980).
36. The only states to adopt the proposal were Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §§ 104-108
(West Supp. 1982-83), Pennsylvania, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521 (Purdon 1981), and West
Virginia, W. Va. Code §§ 55-2A-1 to 55-2A-6 (1981). See Robert A. Leflar, The New ConflictsLimitationsAct, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 461,465 n.33 (1984).
37. Under the "vested rights" approach to conflicts of law, legal rights and d.ties vest at a certain
place and time, and other sovereign jurisdictions merely recognize and enforce these obligations.
The concept relies heavily on notions of territoriality. Wani, supranote 17, at 682.
38. Restatement of Conflict ofLaws § 377 (1934).
39. See generally Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963); David F.
Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-LawProblem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933).
40. Leflar, supranote 36, at 466.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
emerged as dominant.4 These two conflicts theories are the "most
significant relationship"'42 test and "interest analysis."43
States are free to choose their own choice of law methodology,
however, and some continued to follow the traditional vested rights
approach.' Others adopted either the Restatement's "significant
relationship" test,4' or professor Currie's interest analysis.46 Still others
employed some mixture of the old and new theories.4 7 The second
attempt of the Uniform Law Commissioners recognized and provided for
the diversity of choice of law methods among the states.48

II.

THE UNIFORMACT

The second effort to establish a uniform system for selecting a statute
49
of limitation resulted in the Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct.
Although different choice of law principles and methods were
considered, the drafters rejected the idea of enshrining a particular choice
of law rule in the Uniform Act. Instead, the Uniform Act calls for
application of the forum's choice of law methodology to determine
which state's substantive law governs the claim. 50 The state whose
substantive law governs also supplies the statute of limitation.5' The
relevant portion of the Uniform Act provides as follows:

41. Wani, supra note 17, at 709-14 (mentioning third theory as well, but giving it less
consideration).
42. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971) (torts); Id. § 188 (contracts). The
"most significant relationship" test of the Restatement requires the court to identify the contacts with
related states and consider the significance of those contacts with respect to goals of a conflicts
system and the policy interests of the states. For the purposes of this Comment, "Restatement" refers
to the Restatement (Second) ofConflict ofLaws.
43. See generally Currie, supra note 39; Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke L.J. 171. Professor Currie's "interest analysis" calls for application of
the law of the state with a legitimate state interest with respect to the issue. In the event that more
than one state has a legitimate state interest, Professor Currie would apply the forum state's law.
44. Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 Hastings L.J. 1041, 1051-1169
(1987) (discussing choice of law rule for each state and identifying several states that employ First
Restatement's vested rights approach).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Leflar, supranote 36, at 464-68.
49. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct, 12 U.L.A. 61, 61-65 (Supp. 1994).
50. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(1), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
51. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(l), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
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§ 2. Conflict of Laws; Limitation Periods
(a)

(b)

Except as provided by Section 4, if a claim is
substantively based:
(1)

upon the law of one other state, the limitation
period of that state applies; or

(2)

upon the law of more than one state, the
limitation period of one of those states chosen
by the law of conflict of laws of this State,
applies.

The limitation period of this State applies to all other
claims. 2

As mentioned, the Uniform Act does not invoke any particular choice
of law methodology. Each state is free to determine the su.bstantive law
governing the case based on its own choice of law determination.53 The
goal of the Uniform Act is not to establish a uniform approach to
conflicts, but instead to tie the limitation period to the law upon which
the case is substantively based. 4
One commentator has referred to the Uniform Act's approach to
statutes of limitation as "substantive." 55 This is true to the extent that the
Uniform Act rejects the traditional rule characterizing statutes of
limitation as procedural and thus subject to forum law. A truly
substantive issue, however, would not be tied to any other choice of law
determination.56 Under the Restatement, for example, the statute of
limitation is handled as a separate issue to be determined independently
under the "significant relationship" test.5 Therefore, it would be possible
under the Restatement to have one state's laws governing the substantive
claim and another state's laws governing the limitation period.58 The
analytical method under the Uniform Act is more appropriately
characterized by another commentator as a "unitary approach."59 This
52. Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 61,63.
53. See Leflar, supranote 36, at 467-68.
54. Leflar, supranote 36, at 476.
55. Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. I11.L. Rev. 683, 702
(1991).
56. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 38-39; see also Wani, supra note 17, at 706-07.
57. Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws § 142(1) (1971).
58. Wani, supranote 17, at 707.
59. Id.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
term accurately reflects the fact that under the Uniform Act, a
determination of a substantive law governing the claim also resolves the
question of which statute of limitation applies.6"
Thus, under the Uniform Act, the forum's choice of law methodology
is not applied independently of the statute of limitation issue. The
Uniform Act only provides for application of the forum's conflict
methodology to the limitation issue when no single substantive law can
be identified as the basis for the particular claim."s
Any discussion of how the Uniform Act should be applied must
consider the historical development which led to its promulgation. The
Uniform Act was developed to provide a comprehensive and uniform
substitute for judicial escape devices and borrowing statutes.62 Thus, the
Uniform Act was intended to remedy the same problems that escape
devices and borrowing statutes were intended to cure: forum shopping
and law selection.63
III. THE UNIFORMACTIN WASHINGTON: THE RICE AND
WILLIAMS CASES
The Uniform Act has been adopted by the legislatures of six states,'
including Washington's, where it was passed in 1983 with little or no
discussion.65 Since then, Washington courts have had the opportunity to
apply the law only occasionally. The two cases which provide the most
thorough analysis of a conflict between statutes of limitation are Rice v.
Dow Chemical Co. 66 and Williams v. State.67 The Rice case illustrates the

60. Uniform Conflict ofLaws-Limitations Act § 2(a)(1), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
61. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct § 2(b)(1), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
62. Prefatory note to the Uniform Act, 12 U.L.A. 61, 62 (giving brief history of development of
law relating to statutes of limitation and stating that Uniform Act is current version of effort
"designed to replace these variant borrowing acts").
63. The purpose of escape devices and borrowing statutes is to ameliorate the problems of forum
shopping and law selection associated with characterization of statutes of limitation as procedural.
See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text In order to replace escape devices and borrowing
statutes the Uniform Act should perform their functions.
64. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-56-201 to 16-56-210 (Michie 1985); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-82101 to 13-82-107 (West 1984); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-2-501 to 27-2-507 (1991); N.D. Cent. Code
§§ 28-01.2-01 to 28-01.2-05 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 12.410-12.480 (1988); Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 4.18.010-904 (1983); see Uniform Conflict ofLaws-Limitations Act, 12 U.L.A. 61.
65. There was no testimony or argument against the bill, and the arguments for the bill were
uniformity and prevention of forum shopping. H.R. Rep., H.B. 925,48th Leg. (1983).
66. 124 Wash. 2d 205, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994).
67. 76 Wash. App. 237, 885 P.2d 845 (1994).
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importance of identifying a governing substantive law for an analysis
under the Uniform Act. The Rice court, however, did not clearly
enunciate an analytical framework for accomplishing this task. The
Williams case demonstrates the difficulty courts will experience in
attempting to apply the Uniform Act absent clear guidelines on this point.
In Rice v. Dow Chemical Co., the Washington Supreme Court faced
the question of whether to apply Oregon's two-year limitation period or
Washington's three-year limitation period.68 The case involved a claim
by a worker against a herbicide manufacturer, alleging that exposure to
the herbicide caused the worker to develop leukemia.69 For the purposes
of its decision, the court assumed that plaintiff had been extensively and
routinely exposed to herbicides over a course of four years while
working in Oregon.7" The Plaintiff moved to Washington in 1967 and
was accidentally splashed with herbicides once while in Washington.7
The Defendant sought to dismiss plaintiffs claims based on Oregon's
eight-year statute of repose and two-year statute of limitation.72
The supreme court stated that, although Washington and Oregon's
limitation periods differed, "variations in limitation periods are not
subject to conflict of laws methodology."'73 The court interpreted the
Uniform Act as mandating first a determination of which state's
substantive law applied and then application of that state's limitation
period.74 The court went on to state, however, that the difference in the
statutes of repose could raise a conflict of substantive law." Although the
time frame within which the plaintiff could have brought the claim under
Washington's statute of repose was unclear, under any circumstances it
was longer than Oregon's.7 6 The court applied Washington's conflicts

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Rice, 124 Wash. 2d at 210, 875 P.2d at 1216.
Id. at 207, 875 P.2d at 1214.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207-08, 875 P.2d at 1214-15.
Id. at 210, 875 P.2d at 1216.
Id.

75. According to the court, a statute of repose is distinguishable from a statute of limitation in that
the former prevents the cause of action from accruing, while the latter bars plaintiff from bringing a
cause of action that has accrued. Id. at 211-12, 875 P.2d at 1216-17. This Comment does not
consider the narrower question of whether, under the court's interpretive framework, statutes of
repose should give rise to conflicts in substantive law. Instead, the Comment advocates a mode of
analysis which makes such a determination irrelevant for purposes of determining the applicable
statute of limitation.
76. Id. at 212-13, 875 P.2d at 1217.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
methodology77 to the conflict between the statutes of repose and
concluded that Oregon had the most significant relationship with the
case." The court then held that the Plaintiffs claim was barred by
Oregon's statute of repose.79 In a brief sentence the court finished by
noting that the application of Oregon law to the substantive claim
required application of the Oregon limitation period as well.8"
Courts looking to the supreme court's analysis in Rice will discover a
gap in the analysis which limits its usefulness. For any analysis under the
Uniform Act, the court must be able to identify the law which forms the
substantive basis for the claim.8' In view of the fact that the supreme
court ultimately felt compelled to apply Oregon's statute of limitation,
Oregon's substantive law must have been held to govern the claim.
Nevertheless, it is not clear how the court arrived at that conclusion. The
only substantive issue analyzed by the court was the issue of which
state's statute of repose governed the claim. Perhaps Oregon's
substantive law formed the basis for the claim because Oregon's statute
of repose applied to the claim. As will be discussed, infra, this is not a
method of analysis which best promotes the purpose of the Uniform Act.
Furthermore, the supreme court did not make it clear that this was the
method of analysis it was adopting. Because the Rice court merely
identified one substantive conflict, resolved it, and applied Oregon's
statute of limitation, it never clearly articulated a method for identifying
the law which formed the substantive basis for the claim. It is that gap
which will cause confusion among the lower courts.
The Washington Court of Appeals faced a similar conflicts situation in
Williams v. State.82 In Williams, an Oregon resident was killed when his
truck struck the bridge between Vancouver, Washington and Portland,
Oregon. 3 The Plaintiff filed wrongful death actions against both Oregon
and Washington, but it is the suit against Oregon that is relevant here. As
in Rice, the Plaintiffs ability to recover in Washington depended to
some degree on whether Washington's three-year or Oregon's two-year
77. Washington has adopted the Restatement's approach to conflicts issues. Johnson v. Spider
Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of
Washington's choice of law methodology, see Philip A. Trautman, Choice of Law in WashingtonThe Evolution Continues, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 69 (1988)
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Rice, 124 Wash. 2d at 216, 875 P.2d at 1219.
Id.
Id. at 217, 875 P.2d at 1219.
Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
76 Wash. App. 237, 885 P.2d 845 (1994).
Id. at 238, 885 P.2d at 846-47.
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statute of limitation applied.' In Williams, however, there was a conflict
between the non-claim statutes of the two jurisdictions." Oregon's nonclaim statute required that notice of claims against the state be given
within one year of the injury, whereas Washington required notice within
three years.86 Oregon's one-year non-claim statute and Washington's
analogous three-year period provided the substantive conflict for the
7
8

case.

The Washington Court of Appeals, citing Rice, recognized that
limitation periods are not subject to the conflict of laws methodology. 8
Apparently ignoring this admonition, however, the court proceeded to
consider each state's relationship to the case along with its respective
interest in applying its own statute of limitation. 9 The ccurt concluded
that Washington's interests were greater in relation to the statute of
limitation issue.9" The court then followed the same inquiry with regard
to the non-claim statutes and determined that Oregon's non-claim statute
barred the claim.9 Although the determination that Washington law
provided the applicable statute of limitation may be dicta, it is dicta that
demonstrates a misunderstanding among the courts.
There is little question that the appeals court in Williams did not
follow the supreme court's lead in Rice. The Uniform Act calls for the
application of the statute of limitation of the jurisdiction upon whose law
the claim is "substantively based." Both the Rice and Williams cases
involved a conflict between Oregon and Washington statutes of
limitation in addition to another substantive conflict. In the Rice case, the
additional substantive issue was the difference between statutes of
repose, and in the Williams case it was a conflict between notice periods.
In Rice, the supreme court declined to apply Washington's conflicts
methodology to the limitation issue itself. Despite the fact that it
84. Id. at 241, 885 P.2d at 847-48.
85. The so-called non-claim statute in the case was a law requiring that, in tort actions against the
state, notice be given to the state within a certain period after the alleged loss or injury. The court,
citing Lane v. Department of Labor & Industry, 21 Wash. 2d 420, 425-26, 151 P.2d 440 (1944),
distinguished statutes of limitation from non-claim statutes and held that the latter could provide a
substantive conflict. See also Uniform Conflict ofLaws-Limitations Act § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 61, 63
(limitation period refers only to commencement of action and does not refer to requirements for
giving notice of claims).
86. Williams, 76 Wash. App. at 241, 885 P.2d Et 847.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 245, 885 P.2d at 850.
89. Id. at 245-48, 885 P.2d at 850-5 1.
90. Id. at 247, 885 P.2d at 850-51.
91. Id. at 248-49, 885 P.2d at 851-52.
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expressly recognized that rule, the Williams court did apply the conflicts
methodology to the limitation issue.
The lower court's difficulties can be traced to the supreme court's
failure to articulate a clear standard for determining the governing
substantive law. As mentioned above, the supreme court in Rice
concluded that Oregon law governed but failed to articulate a method for
reaching that conclusion.92 The court considered only the conflict
between the statutes of repose in its decision. Thus, arguably the court
adopted an approach under which the determination of any substantive
conflict is dispositive of the substantive law on which the claim is based.
If the supreme court indeed adopted this approach, then it is not
surprising that the Williams court did not apprehend it. This is not the
necessary interpretation of the Uniform Act, nor does it best promote the
goals and intent of the Act.93
IV. SELECTING A SUBSTANTIVE BASIS
The Uniform Act states that "if a claim is substantively based on the
law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies."9" Under
the Uniform Act, therefore, the limitation issue is not generally subject to
an independent conflicts analysis.9 5 Instead, it is tied to the law that
forms the substantive basis for the claim.96 Recognizing that this will not
always be feasible, the Uniform Act does permit application of the
conflicts methodology to the limitation issue in the event that no single
substantive base for the case can be identified.97
The definition of the phrase "substantively based" will determine the
frequency with which statutes of limitation will, in practice, be tied to the
body of law that invokes the statute of limitation at issue in the case. If
"substantively based" refers to the law which invokes the statute of
92. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
93. But see Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 61, 63 ("This section
treats limitation periods as substantive, to be governed by the limitation law of a state whose law
governs other substantive issues inherent in the claim"). This quote might support a position
contrary to that advocated here. But, much as the law on which a claim is "substantively based" is
subject to different interpretations, "issues inherent in the claim" is a term which might be
interpreted in various ways as well. This term should probably be interpreted to include only those
issues which relate to the underlying claim rather than peripheral substantive issues. See infra notes
98-110 and accompanying text.
94. Uniform Conflict ofLaws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(1), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
95. Uniform Conflict ofLaws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(1), 12 U.L.A. 61, 63.
96. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(1), 12 U.L.A. at 63.
97. Uniform Conflict of Laws-LimitationsAct § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. at 63.
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limitation then it is less likely that the limitation issue will be subject to
an independent conflicts analysis. Such an approach would focus on the
law underlying the claim. If, however, the term is interpreted to include
any substantive issue related to the claim, then an independent conflicts
analysis will be applied to the limitation issue more frequently. Such an
interpretation would tend to focus more on peripheral98 substantive
issues.
In order to fully understand both the difficulty and importance of
identifying a substantive basis purposes choosing an applicable statute of
limitation under the Uniform Act, four possible factual. scenarios are
considered below. An outcome for each of the fact patterns is predicted
based on an approach that focuses on the law creating the cause of action
and an approach that does not.
It will become clear while discussing the four scenarios below that the
concerns expressed herein arise whenever the choice of law methodology
involves any type of interest analysis. 99 Interest analysis, or a modified
form of interest analysis such as that embodied in the Restatement, is
currently enjoying popularity among states,' 0 and is welcomed by courts
because of the flexibility it offers to judges.' Washington is one of
several states which has adopted the modified interest analysis set forth
in the Restatement, which requires considering the relevant state
interests. 2 Therefore, the concerns expressed herein are relevant to both
Washington and a growing number of other states.
The distinguishing feature between interest analysis and other conflict
methodologies is that different issues in a single case give rise to
different state interests. A state's interest in application of its product
liability law will be very different from its interest in applying its host-

98. The term "peripheral" is used in this Comment to refer to a law other than the law which acts
as the referent for the application of a particular statute of limitation.
99. The concerns do not arise with respect to certain other conflicts methodologies such as the
doctrine of vested rights. Under that doctrine, the law of the place where the cause of action accrued
governs the case. The determination of governing law, therefore, would not vary depending on the
issue subject to the conflicts methodology. This is equally true for modem conflicts theories that do
not involve an evaluation of a state's interest, such as a center of gravity or strict contact counting
analysis. For a complete discussion of the different types of conflicts analysis s-.e Smith, supra note
44, at 1043-48.
100. See Smith, supra note 44, at 1046 (identifying Restatement as most popular choice of law
methodology).
101. Id. at 1048.
102. See Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 580, 555 P.2d 9'7, 1000 (1976).
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guest statute."0 3 Because the law of the state with the greatest interest on
a given issue is applied, the laws of several states may govern different
issues in a single case.
1.

Scenario One-Conflicts of UnderlyingLaw

This scenario imagines a conflict between each state's law on the
underlying claim. Using the hypothetical in the introduction,'04 State B
has a strict liability law for manufacturers, whereas State C does not.
This is a conflict between the laws which underlie the claim. In the
hypothetical, the court in State C determined that State B's strict liability
law should govern. Because section 2(a)(1) of the Uniform Act directs
that the limitation period of the state upon whose law the claim is
substantively based applies, State B's limitation period applies. This
scenario presents no difficulties.
2.

Scenario Two-Conflicts Between Both Underlying andPeripheral
Law

A second scenario begins from the same premise: The court in State C
determines that State B's strict liability law is applicable. This time the
situation is complicated by the fact that State C also has a statute of
repose that, like the statute of limitation, is longer than that of State B. As
noted, conflicts between statutes of repose give rise to substantive
conflicts.0 5 State C will apply its conflicts methodology and may
determine that its own longer statute of repose is applicable to the case.
This creates a situation where laws from two different states govern
substantive issues in the case. State B's strict liability law governs rights
and liabilities and invokes the statute of limitation, but State C's statute
of repose applies to the case.

103. A host-guest statute bars a passenger in an automobile from bringing an action against the
driver for injuries sustained due to the driver's negligent driving. In the case of a product liability
law, the state interest at stake may be deterring unsafe products in the market. With respect to hostguest statutes, the interest may be protection of insurance companies from collusive suits.
104. The hypothetical supposed that a corporation operates solely within State A but distributes
products to customers throughout the United States. A customer in State B wants to sue the
corporation under a statute unique to State B which imposes strict liability on manufacturers. It has
been three years since the injury, however, and both State A and State B's two-year statutes of
limitation have expired. The customer does some research and discovers that State C has a six-year
limitation period for actions sounding in tort.
105. See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
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The question under the Uniforn Act is whether a single state's law can
be identified as the "substantive base" for the claim. If so, then the statute
of limitation of that state applies. If, however, more than one state's laws
form the substantive basis for the claim, then an independent conflicts
analysis will be performed with respect to the statutes of limitation issue.
Depending on the interpretation of the phrase "substantively based" the
statute of limitation may or may not be subject to an independent
analysis in this scenario.
If an approach that focuses on the law underlying the claim is applied,
then the law of a single state will be identifiable as the law upon which
the claim is substantively based. For example, in the hypothetical, an
emphasis on the underlying law would focus attention on the strict
liability law of State B. The strict liability law of State B is the law which
invokes the statute of limitation and gives rise to the liability to which
the statute of limitation is directed. Therefore, under the approach
advocated here, the law of State B forms the substantive basis for the
claim.
If, however, the strict liability law and the statute of repose are both
viewed as parts of the substantive basis for the claim, then section 2(a)(2)
of the Uniform Act requires that the conflicts methodology be applied
directly to the limitation issue. This will be the result if the underlying
law is given no more weight than any peripheral substantive issue. Under
this interpretation, there would be no consideration of the fact that the
strict liability law is the law which created the cause of action. The laws
of two different states govern substantive issues in the case, therefore the
limitation issue would be subject to an independent analysis.
3.

Scenario Three-Conflicts in PeripheralLaw

In this scenario, the strict liability laws of State B and State C are the
same. There still exists, however, a conflict between the statutes of
repose of State B and C. Due to the nature of the state interests that are
implicated by statutes of repose, the court determines that State C's
statute of repose applies despite the limited contacts that State C has with
the case.
Having resolved the conflict on statutes of repose, a court in State C,
under an interpretation which emphasizes peripheral substantive issues,
concludes State C's statute of limitation applies. If the court's analysis
stops at this point, it will have identified a state whose law governs a
substantive issue. Under the Uniform Act, the court then applies that
state's statute of limitation. This occurs despite the fact that a conflicts
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analysis applied to the law underlying the claim in the case reveals that
State B has a much greater interest in applying its strict liability law to
this case."'
Under an interpretation which emphasized underlying law, the court
would not stop its analysis at the determination of the law governing the
statute of repose question. It would identify which state's law formed the
substantive basis for the claim and would apply that state's limitation
period. In order to determine the law upon which the claim is
substantively based, the court would perform a conflicts analysis on the
underlying law. This would lead to the application of the limitation
period of the state with the greatest interest in the case with respect to the
creation and regulation of the liability.
4.

Scenario Four-Conflictsin Neither UnderlyingNor Peripheral
Law

In the final scenario the substantive law of the two states is the same
and the only conflict is between two states' statutes of limitation. This is
a situation where State C and State B have the same strict liability law
and same statutes of repose but different statutes of limitation. State C
has only the minimum contacts necessary to assert jurisdiction over the
defendant.
The general rule in conflicts cases is that where there is no conflict
between the law of the forum and the law of a foreign state, the forum
does not engage in a conflicts analysis but instead simply applies forum
law.'0 7 Because this situation is not covered by section 2(a) of the
Uniform Act, it will probably fall under the "all other claims" language
of section 2(b).'0 8 Therefore, the forum applies its statute of limitation
regardless of its connection to the cause of action in any case that
involves only a conflict between statutes of limitation. 9 In the
hypothetical, then, if the suit is filed in State C, under an interpretation of
the Uniform Act that does not emphasize the underlying law, State C

106. This could be the result, for example, if the plaintiff is from State B, the product was
produced and purchased in State B, the injury occurred in State B, and the judicially recognized
purpose of the strict liability law is to compensate injured persons and deter manufacturers from
introducing dangerous products into the marketplace.
107. See, e.g., Rice v. Dow Chemical Co., 124 Wash. 2d 205, 210, 875 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1994)
(stating that to engage in choice of determination, there must first be actual conflict between laws).
108. Uniform Conflict ofLaws-LimitationsAct, § 2, 12 U.L.A. 61, 63).
109. Wani, supranote 17, at 700.
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applies its own statute of limitation under section 2(b) of the Uniform
Act.
It is suggested that when a court is faced with a conflict only between
statutes of limitation, it treat that conflict as a conflict between the
underlying statutes and apply the conflicts methodology to those laws
instead. Due to the different nature of the interests invoked, this could
very well lead to a different outcome than application of the forum law.
Although unorthodox,"' this approach has been applied"' and leads to a
result more consistent with the purpose of the Uniform Act.
V.

EFFECTUATING THE LEGISLATURE'S ACTION

When the Washington legislature adopted the Unifoim Act, it had
several conflict methodologies from which to choose. It could have, for
example, adopted a completely substantive model such as that embodied
in the Restatement. The legislature, however, did not adopt the
Restatement's model, under which each issue including the statute of
limitation is treated as a separate substantive conflict. Instead, the
legislature adopted the unitary approach of the Unibrm Act. The
Washington courts should adopt an analytical framework that effectuates
this selection, rather than one which marginalizes it.
As was discussed earlier, forum shopping and law selection occur in
situations where the court applies a statute of limitation that is unrelated
to the underlying law. The Uni/brm Act is an attempt to limit the
occurrence of forum shopping and law selection by mandating
application of a related limitation period. In three of the four scenarios
described above, an approach which does not focus on the underlying
law eliminates any assurance that the relationship between the statute of
limitation and the underlying law will be preserved. The:re are different
reasons for this depending on whether scenario two or 3cenarios three
and four are being considered. Under scenario two, an approach which
does not focus on the underlying law can result in application of the

110. Generally courts will only apply a conflicts analysis if there is an actual conflict. See supra
note 107 and accompanying text. However, this general rule is not inconsistent with the approach
advocated here because there is a conflict between the laws of the different states. This is merely a
method for resolving the conflict between the statutes of limitation that focuses on a different set of
laws.
11. See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
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conflicts methodology directly to the limitation issue."' In scenarios
three and four, the approach selected will determine whether the
limitation period is actually tied to the underlying law or whether the
applicable limitation period is determined by some other means.
1.

Scenario Two Situations

The situation in scenario two, is one where an interpretation of
"substantively based" which does not focus on the underlying claim can
result in application of the forum state's conflict methodology to the
limitation issue. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Uniform Act to prevent forum shopping and law selection.
There are several reasons why application of a state's conflicts
methodology to the limitation issue is contrary to the purpose of the
Uniform Act. In the most obvious case, a state's conflicts methodology
could categorize statutes of limitation as procedural and apply its own.
Thus, application of the state's conflicts methodology to the limitation
issue would create an analysis and result identical to the traditional,
disfavored approach.
Similarly, there is also a tendency to apply a forum's statute of
limitation if the state's conflicts methodology calls for any type of
interest analysis."' There are two interrelated reasons for this: the
traditional parochial nature of statutes of limitation; and the nature of the
interests invoked with respect to the limitation issue.
Because statutes of limitation were traditionally considered
procedural, courts have historically viewed limitation periods as essential4
and applied sovereign laws of the forum in all circumstances."
Substantial efforts have been made to move courts away from this
categorization to prevent perceived evils associated with it." 5
Nevertheless, the state interests that led to the categorization of statutes
of limitation as procedural still exist. Perhaps the most significant of
these are the concepts of sovereignty and of local control over

112. Although application of the conflicts methodology to the limitation issue can be avoided if
the laws of a single state happen to govern both underlying and peripheral law, due to the nature of
interest analysis it is just as likely that these issues will be governed by the laws of different states.
113. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 39 (observing that courts applying interest analysis to
limitation issue tend to apply forum law); Smith, supra note 44, at 1048 (noting that true interest
analysis is forum favoring).
114. Grossman, supranote 3, at 10-11.
115. See suprapart I.
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administration of the legislative plan." t6 The strong tradition for
application of the forum's statute of limitation may explain the fact that
despite scholarly works considering more varied interests, many courts
are content to consider only the most parochial interests." 7
The legislative purposes for enacting statutes of limitation are rarely
well defined." 8 Moreover, cases and comments dealing with statutes of
limitation rarely discuss or analyze their purpose or funetion." '9 Thus, a
court applying an interest analysis to the limitation issue is permitted
considerable leeway to identify and weigh state interests. One leading
commentator lists three interests underlying limitalion laws: (1)
promoting achievement of justice, (2) providing stability to potential
defendants, and (3) promoting efficient use of judicial resources.'20 These
interests can be summarized as fairness, protection of defendants, and
conservation ofjudicial resources.' 2'

116. One court put it this way:
It is, of course, the forum that is best able to decide when claims are so :;tale that they will
burden its dockets, and only the forum has a significant interest in insuring that its dockets are
not burdened by such claims. In addition, the forum has an interest in the def.-ndant's protection
from stale claims and the plaintiffs pursuit of recovery. We believe that, in any case in which
either party is a New Hampshire resident or the cause of action arose in this State, the sum of
our above stated forum interests in applying our own statute, in combination with the benefit of
simplification afforded by regular application of our own rule, will tip the choice of law balance
in favor of the application of our own limitation period to cases tried here. Thus, in such cases,
our courts may typically apply the relevant New Hampshire statute without appeal to our choiceinfluencing considerations.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1192 (N.H. 1988).
117. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that "not all" courts demonstrate parochial
attitude, implicitly recognizing that problem exists).
118. Wani, supra note 17, at 708-09.
119. Leflar, supra note 36, at 468.
120. Id. at 471. The Washington Court of Appeals in Williams cited the L.eflar article when it
identified the interests to be considered in its statute of limitation analysis. The court, however,
described the interests mentioned by Leflar as (1) the protection of defendants from claims where
defenses may no longer be available, and (2) prevention of possibly unjust judgnents due to delays
that result in the danger of unreliable determinations. Williams v. State, 76 Wash. App. 237, 246,
885 P.2d 845, 850 (1994). It is unclear why the court omitted the commonly invoked interest of
conservation ofjudicial resources.
121. Courts and commentators identify additional interests. Leflar mertions an additional
possibility: that selection of a limitation period may represent a policy of relative favoring of one
cause of action over another. Leflar, supra note 36, at 471. A federal court in Washington, in Tomlin
v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1581), felt that a statute of limitalions was intended to
discourage certain types of behavior
The notion that behavior will be affected by a statutory bar to an action is tenuous at best. The
only way a longer or shorter statute of limitation could impact on behavior is if the actor
anticipates the victim's failure to bring the claim within the allotted period of time. Absent some
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Because the fairness consideration is of such a general nature and is
naturally of universal concern, it is unlikely to have any impact on the
question of whose statute of limitation to apply. The Williams court
mentioned and dismissed the consideration, noting that either of
Washington's or Oregon's statutes of limitation would serve for this
purpose.'22 In fact, another commentator identifies only protection of
defendants and conservation of judicial resources as state interests where
statutes of limitation are concerned.'23
An evaluation of each state's relative interest in conserving judicial
resources will almost inevitably weigh in favor of applying the forum's
statute of limitation. If the forum has a shorter limitation period, it will
be interested in applying its shorter period to conserve judicial
resources.' 24 The foreign state will have no interest in having its longer
limitation period applied because its judicial resources are not being
employed. In situations where the forum's statute of limitation is longer
than the foreign state's, absent other considerations or interests, the
forum's law is still more likely to apply. This is because such a situation
is viewed as one in which neither state has an interest in having its law
applied.'25 A forum does not further its interest in conserving judicial
resources by applying a longer statute of limitation, but the foreign state
also has no interest in applying its shorter period. Under pure interest
analysis, this type of situation is resolved in favor of applying the
26
forum's law.'
A given state's interest in providing repose'2 7 for the defendant will
often depend on whether the defendant resides in that state. 2 ' Frequently,
courts only identify a forum interest in providing repose to a defendant if

actuarial study indicating increased liability for longer limitation periods, no rational actor is
going to alter his/her behavior on a contingency so speculative and beyond his/her control.
Id.
122. Williams, 76 Wash. App. at 246, 885 P.2d at 850.
123. Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts between Statutes of Limitation, 27
Hastings L. 1, 10 (1975).
124. Id. at II.
125. Id.
126. Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well-Curried Leflar Approach, 34 Mercer L. Rev.
731, 778 (1983) (noting that author would not necessarily follow this rule).
127. Although this word was used earlier in the context of a statute of repose, it is also a term of
art which describes the situation in which a potential defendant no longer has to worry about liability
because the defendant is entitled to assert the limitation bar as a defense.
128. Milhollin, supra note 123, at 10-1l.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 71:871, 1996

"' Furthermore, a f1oreign state's
the defendant resides in the forum. 29
interest in providing repose to defendants who are re.;idents of the
foreign state will not be impaired if the forum state applies its own,
shorter statute of limitation. Thus, the only situation in which a foreign
state will be deemed to have a greater interest in providing repose to the
defendant is when the defendant resides in that state and that state has a
shorter limitation period than the forum. 3
Because of the parochial nature of statutes of limitation, the flexibility
which interest analysis affords courts, and the nature of the interests
invoked by a conflict between statutes of limitation, it appears likely that
the forum will apply its own limitation period. The expectation that a
court will apply a cursory interest analysis to arrive at application of the
forum's law has empirical support.
Consider the case of New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3
where the Supreme Court of Massachusetts identified several interests to
justify its conclusion to apply the forum's longer limitation period.
Included among the interests cited by the court was the preference
expressed by the State of Massachusetts that contracts be enforceable
within six years of the accrual of the cause of action.'32 Another
consideration was that Massachusetts could have, but hat not, enacted
broad legislation importing the statutes of limitation of other States.' 33
Finally, the court noted that the predictability of the judicial process in
providing answers with respect to completed transactions would be
lessened by an abrupt change of law in this case.'34 The court was
referring to the fact that Massachusetts was taking its first steps to
discard the traditional notion that statutes of linaitation were
procedural. 3
A court considering these types of interests does not depart very far,
if at all, from the traditional characterization of statutes of limitation as
procedural. The court's consideration of the forum. legislature's
preference for its statute of limitation is just the type of interest that will
inevitably lead to application of the forum's law if the conflicts analysis
is applied to the limitation issue. Others have supported this conclusion.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. New England Tel. & Tel. v. Gourdeau Constr. Co., 647 N.E.2d 42 (Mass. 1995).
132. Id. at 45.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 46.
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For example, one court refused to apply its conflict analysis to the
limitation issue, pointing out that to do so would increase the opportunity
for forum shopping. 36 A scholar noted that treating the limitation issue
as an independent issue
often resulted in application of the forum's
37
limitation.
of
statute
The Washington appellate court's analysis in Williams demonstrates
that a Washington court might not handle the issue much differently.
There the court erroneously applied the Washington conflicts
methodology to the limitation issue.'38 After identifying fairness and
protection of defendants as the relevant interests, the court concluded
that Oregon's interest in seeing its liability barred by its shorter statute of
limitation did not outweigh Washington's interest as co-defendant and
the forum.'39 The fact that Washington was the forum appears to have
tipped the scales in Washington's favor.
The cases above reflect an attitude and mode of analysis that will
almost inevitably lead to application of the forum's limitation period. It
is not necessary, however, that a court apply the forum's limitation
period in all situations to imperil the goals of the Uniform Act. Damage
enough is done if a court has wide latitude to apply the forum's law
regardless of the state's connection to the underlying claim. The Uniform
Act is an attempt to tie the limitation period and the law which is the
basis for the claim together. 4 ' An interpretation of the Act which permits
a court to apply the forum's law regardless of its connection to the basis
for the claim is contrary to that purpose.
2.

Scenario Three andFourSituations

The problem with automatically applying the forum's statute of
limitation in a situation such as scenario four is that it does nothing to
discourage forum shopping. The typical forum shopping situation does
not necessarily involve any difference in substantive law. In Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine,'4' for example, there was not necessarily any
difference between the libel laws of the different states. Instead, the
plaintiff sought out the New Hampshire court solely for its limitation
136.
137.
138.
139.

Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28,32 n.10 (3d Cir. 1977).
Grossman, supranote 3, at 39.
See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
Williams v. State, 76 Wash. App. 237, 246, 885 P.2d 845, 850 (1994).

140. Wani, supra note 17, at 706-07, 714.
141. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
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period which exceeded the limitation period of any othe:r state in the
country. 42 If a state automatically applies its own statute of limitation
when a claim is filed, the opportunity for forum shopping will persist,
and the purpose of the Act will be thwarted.
In a scenario three, under an approach that does not emphasize
underlying law, the resolution of conflicting peripheral issues determines
the applicable statute of limitation. The problem with such an approach is
not immediately obvious because the outcome of the cor.flict analysis
depends on the nature of the interests invoked, which, in tun, depends
on the peripheral issue. Nevertheless, it is clear that the nature of the
interests invoked with respect to the peripheral issue will not necessarily
be the same as the interests which would be invoked in an analysis of
underlying law. Because the interests are not necessarily similar, the
effect of focusing on the peripheral issue will be to tie the limitation
period to the peripheral issue instead of the underlying law.
The most obvious example of the problematic result of an approach
that focuses on peripheral law occurs when the peripheral lew is a statute
of repose. Because of the similarity between statutes of limitation and
statutes of repose, courts often treat them identically. 4 3 This Comment
discussed earlier the problems associated with a modem conflicts
analysis applied to the limitation issue."4 If the applicable statute of
limitation is tied to a repose issue which is identical to a limitation issue,
this is effectively the same as treating the limitation issue as a separate
substantive issue. The result is an analysis more consistant with that
espoused in the Restatement than the one selected by the: Washington
legislature. Furthermore, all of the problems associated with applying the
conflicts methodology to the limitation issue discussed earlier would
arise.
In the Rice case, the disposition of the repose issue may have been
determinative of the issue of which state's limitation period to apply. If
the interests identified are identical, then the two analyses are identical.
However, even if different peripheral issues with differeni interests are
involved, there may be problems with this approach. For example, it is
difficult to argue that the determination of which state's statute of repose,
or notice statute, applies really establishes a substantive basis for the
142. Id. at 773.
143. See, e.g., Gantes v. Kason Corp., No. A-31, 1996 WL 408532 (N.J. July 23, 1996)
(identifying New Jersey's two-year statute of limitation and Georgia's ten-year statute of repose, as
well as interest in eliminating stale claims behind Georgia's statute of repose).
144. See supra notes 112-40 and accompanying text.
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claim. Oregon's interest in receiving notice might overwhelm any
Washington interest, even in a case occurring completely in Washington
state. It would be difficult to justify applying Oregon's statute of
limitation to bar all claims against all co-defendants based on the fact
that Oregon law governs that single issue. Nevertheless, that could be the
result under an approach which focuses on that peripheral issue, instead
of establishing which state's law governs the underlying law.
The approach advocated here for handling the situations in scenarios
three and four requires application of the conflicts methodology to laws
between which no actual conflict exists. Although this might appear to
entail difficulties, in fact the nature of the state interests invoked often do
not require that an actual conflict exist to determine which state's interest
is greater. Furthermore, existing cases demonstrate that this type of
analysis has been successfully employed before.
An example is the seminal case of Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., which
was the first case to discard the procedural characterization and
undertake an interest-type analysis to determine which state's law
governed the underlying claim. 4 In Heavner, a North Carolina resident
who bought a truck trailer with a Uniroyal tire mounted on one of its
wheels brought a product liability suit against the tire manufacturer,
Uniroyal, and the seller of the truck.'46 At issue was whether to apply
New Jersey's recently adopted statute of limitation or North Carolina's
shorter statute of limitation. 47 The court noted that the plaintiffs were
residents of North Carolina, defendant was a New Jersey corporation, codefendant was a Delaware corporation, the purchase took place in North
Carolina, and the accident took place in North Carolina.4S The court also
stated in a footnote that the plaintiff obviously had been shopping for a
forum in which its claim would not be barred and where it could avail
itself of more favorable substantive law.'49 The court held that under
New Jersey interest analysis, upon which it did not elaborate, New Jersey
did not have sufficient interest to apply its own law.'5 0 It concluded that
where there was not sufficient interest to apply New Jersey substantive
law, it would not apply New Jersey's statute of limitation either.'
145. 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973).
146. Id. at 414.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at414n.3.
150. Id. at418.
151. Id.
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Although in Heavner the court implied that some conflict might exist
between New Jersey and North Carolina's law to the extent that North
Carolina may not have recognized strict liability,'52 it did not engage in
an interest analysis to find Norta Carolina's law governed on any
specific issue. It's conclusion that North Carolina's statute of limitation
would govern, contrary to the traditional rule that a forum would apply
its own limitation period, was based on a general finding of governing
substantive law. 53 Much of what motivated the court was scholarly
criticism of the rule that the forum apply its own limitation period.' 54
A general determination of the substantive basis for a claim also was
carried out in Cropp v. InterstateDistributorCo.'5 5 In Cropp, the Oregon
court considered a conflicts situation under the Uniform Act. The case
involved an accident that took place on a highway in California. 156
Without identifying any particular difference between the driving laws of
California and Oregon, the court noted that the plaintiff's allegations
concerned the parties' rights and responsibilities on California highways,
which were rights defined and regulated by California law.' 5 7 The
majority concluded that the claim was therefore based on Califorhia's
substantive law. 58 The dissent encouraged an interest analysis which
considered, among other things, the states' relative interests with respect
to the statutes of limitation issue. 5 9 As might be expected, the majority
held that the foreign statute of limitation governed while the dissent
would have applied forum law. 6
This type of analysis has been employed even in the ninth circuit. In
an unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mansfield
152. Id. at414 n.3.
153. Id. at 418.
154. Id. at 415-18.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

880 P.2d 464 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
dissenting).
Id. at 466-68 (Rossman, J.,

160. The majority chastises the dissent in a footnote, stating:
The dissent erroneously concludes that Oregon's substantive law is applicable because of
Oregon's 'substantial interest' and California's 'negligible interest' in the outcome of the case.
As stated above, the proper inquiry, under ORS 12.430 (the Uniform Act-eds.), is what law
forms the substantive basis of the claims, not which state has a more substanlial interest in the
application of its law. The dissent criticizes us for concluding that plairtiffs' claims are
substantively based on California law. It concludes that Oregon's limitation p.-riod applies, but
never explains how plaintiff's claims could be substantively based on Oregon law.
Id. at 466 n.3.

Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act
v. Watson,161 a patient sued her Oregon-based therapist for a rape which

had occurred while the patient was working in Oregon.1 62 The court,
citing the Act, noted that "if the claim is substantively based upon the
law of one state, the limitation period of that state applied."' 63 Applying
the Restatement's significant relationship test, the court held that in order
to determine which state's substantive law governs it must weigh (1) the
contacts of each state with the cause of action, (2) each state's interest in
having its law applied, and (3) the justifiable expectations of the
parties."M The court proceeded to examine each state's contacts with the
event, noting that the relationship developed in Oregon, the rape
occurred there, and that both parties were Oregon residents. 65 The court
found that Washington's only contact was with the plaintiff who moved
there several years after the rape. 66 On this basis the court concluded that
the district court had correctly held that Oregon had the most significant
67
relationship and Oregon's statute of limitation governed. 1
The court in Mansfield engaged in only a limited inquiry but the
decision is intuitively appealing. The court engages in a more general
comparison of contacts and interests to conclude that the claim was
basically an Oregon claim brought to Washington. It focused on the
underlying claim rather than applying the conflicts analysis to the
limitation issue which might well have led to the application of
Washington's statute of limitation. Such a result would have encouraged
forum shopping to take advantage of Washington's longer limitation
period in cases otherwise mostly related to Oregon.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates an interpretation of the Uniform Act that
focuses the analysis thereunder on the law which invokes the statute of
limitation. The Rice court's failure to propose an analytical framework
for identifying the law that forms the substantive basis for a given claim
contributed to the difficulties of the Williams court. Under the choice of
law method advocated in this Comment, a court would conduct the
161. Mansfield v. Watson, No. 90-35649, 1993 WL 74374 (Wash. Mar. 17, 1993) (unpublished
disposition).
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *2.
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analysis for a fact pattern identical to that in the Rice case differently.
The court first would identify the law that forms the substantive basis for
the claim. The Rice case was a tort-based product liability action.'68
There was a conflict between statutes of limitation so the court would
apply Washington's conflict methodology to the product liability law of
both states. The court would identifI and weigh the relative contacts and
interests of both states in the application of their product liability laws.
Once a determination had been made as to which state's tort law applied,
the court would apply that state's statute of limitation as well. Finally,
the court would make a separate determination of the applicable statute
of repose, which determination would not affect the applicable statute of
limitation.
There are two basic models for selecting statutes of limitation now
that the traditional procedural characterization has been discarded. The
Restatement's method treats each issue, including the limitation issue as
an independent substantive issue. The Uniform Act, on the other hand,
ties the limitation period to the law that forms the substantive basis for
the claim. This Comment demonstrates how an approach that fails to
focus on the law that invokes the statute of limitation tends to dissolve
the link between the statute of limitation and the underlying law. The
courts should adopt a rule that focuses on the underlying law, thereby
effectuating the goal of the Uniform Act and the intent of the legislature
in adopting it.

168. Rice v. Dow Chemical Co., 124 Wash.2d 205, 207, 875 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1994).

